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ANTITRUST LAW-PRICE FIXING--RULE OF REASON IN HEALTH 
CARE-Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, [1980-1] Trade 
Cases (CCH) ~ 63,239 (9th Cir. March 20, 1980). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production; 
and the interest of the producer ought to be attended to only so 
far as it may be necessary for promoting that of the consumer. 1 
Health care is often unavailable in the United States. 2 When 
available, it is increasingly expensive. 3 Many people are under­
insured or simply uninsured. 4 Furthermore, the existence of insur­
ance tends to increase fees5 and induce unnecessary surgery. 6 
In response to this health care crisis the State of Arizona 
brought an action under the Sherman Ace alleging illegal price fix­
ing against two foundations for medical care (FMC's) and the 
county medical society associated with each. s The FMC's are non­
1. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations in 
39 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 287 (R. H. Hutchins ed. 1962). 
2. In 1972 more than 800 towns in the four states of Minnesota, Montana, and 
North and South Dakota were without any doctor. Fifty years earlier four out of five 
of these towns had had at least one general practitioner. S. KLAW, THE GREAT 
AMERICAN MEDICINE SHOW: THE UNHEALTHY STATE OF U.S. MEDICAL CARE, AND 
WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 46 (1975). 
3. J. BRAVERMAN, CRISIS IN HEALTH CARE 8-15 (1978). In the six months fol­
lowing former President Nixon's lifting of wage and price controls in the spring of 
1974, doctors' fees rose by 8%, the equivalent of a 16% annual rate and 25% greater 
than the rise in the overall cost of living in that period. S. KLAW, supra note 2, at 16. 
4. As of December 31, 1975, 37.3% of all Americans over the age of 65 were 
uninsured for the costs of hospital care; 78.2% were uninsured for the costs of out-of­
hospital medication; and 80.4% were uninsured for nursing home care. J. 
BRAVERMAN, supra note 3, at 212. 
5. Kallstrom, Health Care Costs Control by Third-Party Payors: Fee schedules 
and the Sherman Act, 1978 DUKE L.J. 645, 647. 
6. S. KLAW, supra note 2, at 6-8. We pay a price for these unnecessary opera­
tions which can not be stated in monetary terms. One surgeon has estimated that at 
least 500 women die each year as a result of complications arising out of unnecessary 
hysterectomies. More generally, unnecessary surgery of all types may take 10,000 
lives in the United States each year. Id. at 9. 
7. 15 U.s.C. §§ 1-2 (1976). 
8. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, [1980-11 TRADE CASES (CCH), 
~ 63,239 at 78,153 (9th Cir. 1980). 
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profit organizations that poll their members from time to time to 
set upper limits on fees the membership may charge patients cov­
ered on approved insurance plans. They also evaluate the medical 
necessity and appropriateness of treatments and the use of hospital 
services. 9 When an increase in the fee ceiling is approved, insur­
ance companies are notified in advance so that they can increase 
premiums to cover their higher costs. 10 The participating physi­
cians draw funds directly from insurers' bank accounts to pay their 
bills.ll The state, in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society,12 
argued that this system was responsible for raising the fees of 
foundation members above fees otherwise charged by Arizona doc­
tors.13 The state brought an injunctive suit to halt the price-fixing 
activity. 14 
Arizona moved for summary judgment on the issue of the 
FMC'S-liability. The United States District Court for the District of 
Arizona denied this motion but certified for appeal15 the question 
of whether the FMC membership agreement, which contained a 
promise to abide by the majority-set prices, was per se illegal un­
der section 1 of the Sherman Act. The United States Court of Ap­
peals for the Ninth Circuit, in a split decision, affirmed the denial 
of summary judgment and remanded with instructions to apply a 
rule of reason analysis, which involves an evaluation of the agree­
ment's impact upon competition within the particular relevant cir­
cumstances in which it arose. 1S 
The court employed three major arguments in denying the 
state's assertion of per se illegality. First, it cited Broadcast Music, 
Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting CO.17 for the proposition that not 
9. [d. 
10. [d. at 78,164 (Larson, J., dissenting). 
11. [d. at 78,153. 
12. [d. 
13. [d. 
14. [d. 
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976) provides for certification for appeal from an or­
der when the district judge is "of the opinion that such order involves a controlling 
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion...." 
16. [1980-1] TRADE CASES (CCH) at 78,157. 
17. 441 U.S. 1 (1979). This case involved a challenge by the Columbia Broad­
casting System [hereinafter referred to as CBS] to the legality of blanket licenses. A 
blanket license allows the licensee to perform any of the several musical composi­
tions in a repertory. Broadcast Music, Inc. [hereinafter referred to as BMI] is an or­
ganization of copyright owners who sold their product, the right to use their music, 
in this fashion. The price of a basket of compositions was sometimes a flat dollar 
amount and, at other times, a percentage of the revenue gained from their use. The 
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every joint action among horizontal competitors18 that has an effect 
upon prices is to be treated as per se illegal price fixing. 19 The 
Maricopa County court held that per se illegality could not be ex­
tended to an industry with which the judiciary has had very little 
experience. 20 
The court also reasoned that the application of the per se rule 
would be inappropriate in light of its own doubts as to the cogency 
of limit price theory. Limit price theory asserts that established 
firms may maximize long-range profits at price levels less than the 
short-run monopoly price by seeking a level that will best inhibit 
entry by competitors and thus in the long run will preserve prices 
greater than those that a competitive environment would allow. 
The state had contended that FMC's are in a position to limit 
prices to protect themselves from potential competition. 21 The 
court, however, noted that some commentators have suggested 
that limit pricing is economically irrational behavior. 22 The court 
concluded that a body of thought as controversial as limit price 
theory cannot serve as a justification for the imposition of liability 
on a motion for summary judgment. 23 Finally, the court suggested 
that the medical profession is not subject to the same antitrust 
rules as other sectors of the economy due to its noncommercial 
character. 24 
lower courts held this an illegal exercise of price fixing. The Supreme Court re­
versed and remanded for a rule of reason analysis. [d. 
18. A "horizontal" relationship is one between firms performing "similar func­
tions" in the manufacture or distribution of a good or service. Brown Shoe Co. v. 
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 334 (1962). 
19. [1980-1) TRADE CASES (CCH) at 78,156. 
20. "[W)e are uncertain about the competitive order that should exist within 
the health care industry pursuant to the Sherman Act as interpreted by the courts. 
Only recently have the professions been brought by the Supreme Court within the 
reach of the Act." [d. at 78,154. "I agree with my brother Sneed that we know too lit­
tle about the effects on competition produced by the practices here in question to 
brand them per se violations of the Sherman Act at this point." [d. at 78,157 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Contra, "It is not our task to determine what the competi­
tive order should be. The Sherman Act requires that absent very unusual circum­
stances market forces should be given free rein." [d. at 78,162 (Larson, J., dis­
senting). 
21. [d. at 78,156 (citing Havighurst, Health Maintenance Organizations and the 
Market for Services, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 716,767-76 (1971)). 
22. Id. at 78,156 (citing R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPEC­
TIVE 115 n.50 (1976)); see Markovits, Potential Competition, Limit Price Theory, and 
the Legality of Horizontal and Conglomerate Mergers Under the American Antitrust 
Laws, 1975 WIS. L. REV. 658. 
23. [1980-1) TRADE CASES (CCH) at 78,156. 
24. [d. at 78,157. 
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Judge Larson, dissenting in Maricopa County, would have re­
versed the denial of summary judgment and granted preliminary 
relief for plaintiff.25 His interpretation of Broadcast Music would 
not allow the exemption of entire industries or professions from the 
per se rule against price fixing.26 He asserted that the whole pur­
pose and effect of the FMC-set maximum prices was to remove de­
sired cost-cutting incentives from doctors and insurers alike. 27 Fur­
thermore, even if the net effect of the arrangement were a reduc­
tion of health care costs, the law looks with the same disfavor upon 
both downward and upward price fixing. 28 Finally, he reasoned 
25. Id. at 78,158-65 (Larson, J., dissenting). Judge Larson's dissent opens with 
some discussion of a procedural issue. The state was appealing from both the denial 
of summary judgment and the vacation of a temporary restraining order which had 
earlier been issued prohibiting further adherence to the fee schedules. The defend­
ants denied that the circuit court had the jurisdiction to hear an appeal on the 
vacation of the restraining order at that point. I d. at 78,153. The dissent asserted that 
the temporary restraining order had been in effect long enough to have become in 
fact, although not in label, a preliminary injunction. Preliminary injunctions can be 
the subject of an interlocutory appeal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1976). Id. 
at 78,158-59. 
The dissent's discussion of the substantive questions is divided into three parts: 
The first addressing the question of whether the practice involved here had 
traditionally been categorized as per se illegal; the second rejecting any claim that 
this case fell within an exemption from traditional antitrust rules; and the third 
arguing that the practice was so plainly anticompetitive that, even if a rule of reason 
analysis were necessary, it would operate to bar the practice on the instant record. 
That third point was important, given the defendant's challenge to the jurisdiction of 
the circuit court, because it contributed to the conclusion that the district court 
plainly had been in error in refusing relief, strengthening the argument in favor of 
the propriety of interlocutory appeal. 
26. In a footnote, Judge Larson stated that the Broadcast Music Court's major 
concern was the danger of a hasty categorization of conduct as price-fixing. The 
Foundation for Medical Care (hereinafter referred to as FMC], however, was very 
clearly fixing prices between horizontal competitors in the instant case. What was 
different here was not the challenged practice itself, but the industry in which it 
occurred. Broadcast Music did not sanction an abandonment of the per se rules on 
the basis of the nature of the particular industry in which they were to be applied. 
Id. at 78,163 n.ll. 
27. "The entire system is designed to avoid providing anyone with an incen­
tive to control costs." Id. at 78,164. The dissent also objected that the "cozy" charac­
ter of the system for insurers and doctors was locking them into the existing pattern, 
so that they would be unwilling to experiment with other forms of health care. Be­
cause of the resultant dearth of experimentation, physicians' incomes were being in­
sulated from competitive pressures. Id. This is not the same argument as the limit 
pricing theory to be examined later, see text accompanying notes 100-19 infra, but it 
is a speculation as to a nonprice mechanism by which established firms may limit 
the possibility of new entry. 
28. [1980-1] TRADE CASES (CCH) at 78,164 (citing National Soc'y of Profes­
sional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,689 (1978) and United States v. Trenton 
Potteries, Inc., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927)). 
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that, although the medical profession may have some degree of an­
titrust exemption for collective, noncommercial activities, price set­
ting is entirely commercial. 29 
This note will analyze the effect that a general acceptance of 
Maricopa County's rule of reason would have upon the policing of 
price competition in the health care field. It will be contended that 
substantial barriers deter potential competition in that field. This 
structural fact makes it possible for the established firms, if allowed 
to set prices in tandem, to price at an entry-limiting level above 
the competitive level. That possibility poses a threat to consumer 
welfare that can be reduced through an adherence to the per se il­
legality rule against price fixing. 
II. ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 
Under conditions of perfect competition30 each producer will 
operate at its own marginal cost. 31 Allowing the free exit and entry 
of suppliers in a particular market will insure that the producers as 
a whole will supply any desired quantity at its lowest cost. 32 This 
condition is optimal since consumers are paying the minimum nec­
essary for that amount of a good or service they are willing to buy. 
29. [d. at 78,16l. 
30. Perfect competition, as defined by economists, exists only if no producer is 
a large enough part of the market to unilaterally affect the market price of a pro­
duced good. Furthermore, every producer must know the methods of every other 
producer. P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 43-48 (lOth ed. 1976). Perfect competition is 
an idealized working hypothesis, comparable to a physicist's assumption of a friction­
less surface. [d. at 69. 
3l. Marginal cost at any output is the extra cost of producing one more unit. 
The law of diminishing returns asserts that, beyond an initial phase utilizing econo­
mies of scale, the marginal cost will rise because more units of inp~t will be neces­
sary to obtain a constant increment to output. Since a perfect competitor is by defi­
nition a firm which cannot unilaterally influence price, it will continue increasing 
production without having to worry about causing a market glut. These production 
increases will cause the marginal cost to increase, until at some point the cost of the 
last unit of output is equal to the extra revenue obtained from selling it; that is, the 
price of that unit. This equality is expressed as the output level where price equals 
marginal cost (P=MC). The supply curve and the marginal cost curve for a perfect 
competitor are identical; each represents the quantity producers are willing to sup­
ply at the various possible p"rices. [d. at 452-57.' 
32. Under conditions of free exit and entry, firms will sell at their minimum 
long-run competitive costs. If the market price drops below this cost level, firms will 
leave the industry, reducing total supply and pushing the price up. If the market 
price is above the minimum long-range cost, new firms will be attracted into the 
market and the price will be pushed down. The economist's use of the word "cost" 
includes a reasonable rate of return on investment-that minimum rate necessary to 
insure further investment. [d. at 472. 
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Economists have given up on the possibility of realizing this 
model of perfect competition. 33 They have substituted the notion 
of workable 'competition, which exists whenever an industry pro­
vides a combination of prices and outputs reasonably compatible 
with consumer welfare and technological progress. 34 The rule of 
reason test for medical association price fixing, enunciated in 
Maricopa County, will be justified only if it can aid in bringing 
about or preserving workable competition. 
The price of any commodity or service is determined by the 
equilibrium of supply and demand:35 any increase in price can be 
explained by either a supply shortage or an increase in demand. If 
the explanation of the contemporary health care crisis is to be 
found in a sudden increase in the demand for care, a focus on sup­
ply would be misplaced. In the field of medical services, however, 
a demand explanation would not be plausible. The reduction in the 
demand for physician hours in the treatment of polio as a result of 
the Salk vaccine is an example of the way in which advances in 
medical technology tend to reduce demand. 36 There is room for 
dispute as to whether the spread of health insurance coverage has 
brought about an increase in the demand for care. 37 Whatever the 
merits of that dispute, it seems clear that the dominant factor 
determining the demand for health care is epidemiology, that is, 
the natural incidence of disease, a force beyond our control. 38 Con­
sequently, a solution to the problems of health care must be sought 
on the side of supply. 
In a noncompetitive industry prices rise above marginal cost. 39 
33. [d. at 531. 
-34. The concept of workable competition was first discussed by Clark, Toward 
a Concept ofW~rkable Competition, 30 AM. ECON. REV. 241 (1940). 
35. P. SAMUELSON, supra note 30, at 63-65. 
36. See, e.g., V. FUCHS, WHO SHALL LIVE? HEALTH, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL 
CHOICE 92-95 (1975). 
37. H. KLARMAN, ECONOMICS OF HEALTH 33-35 (1965). 
38. There are serious limits to the ability of the young science of health eco­
nomics to quantifY relationships between demand for care and price. There is no 
dispute that an increase in the price of health care will cause demand to fall. For ex­
ample, as prices increase people will decide to forego their annual check-tips, or to 
stop going to dermatologists about dandruff. This inverse relation between demand 
and price is called "elasticity." Unfortunately, very little is known about the degree 
of elasticity. V. FUCHS, supra note 36, at 147-48. A further discussion of that problem is 
probably not essential to an understanding of Maricopa County. 
39. A noncompetitive industry is one in which the product of a particular sup­
plier composes a substantial part of the market. Therefore, the quantity which a pro­
ducer in such a situation provides helps to sate the total demand or, put more tech­
nically, drives price down along the demand curve. Only through a p}:1ilanthropic act 
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Therefore, public policy is directed toward the preservation of 
competition. There are two separate concepts of competition. In 
the narrower sense there is what can be termed actual competi­
tion:4o The struggle between rivals for the same trade at the same 
time. 41 But prices also are held in check by potential competition: 
The ease of entry for future rivals into the market. 42 Antitrust pros­
ecutions for price fixing police the actual competition among ex­
isting rivals. This enforcement activity increases in importance as 
the threat of potential competition recedes, that is, as the barriers 
to entry increase. 43 The effects of price fixing therefore are most 
pernicious in markets where the probability of new entry is low, 
for example, where rivalry is discouraged. 
Certain barriers to entry into health care arise as a result of 
the uncertainties involved in predicting the incidence of disease 
and the efficacy of treatment. 44 State laws impose licensing re-
would a supplier in such a situation set price at marginal cost. Consumers would be 
willing to pay more than marginal cost at the profit maximizing level of output. P. 
SAMUELSON, supra note 30, at 512-17. 
40. The term "actual competition" is used here to describe what the cases refer 
to as "competition" when they are using that term in a sense excluding "potential 
competition." See, e.g., Anthony Augliera, Inc. v. Loughlin, 149 Conn. 478, 485, 181 
A.2d 596, 600 (1962); Merchants' Nat'l Bank of Glendive v. Dawson County, 93 
Mont. 310, 321, 19 P.2d 892, 896 (1933). The term is coined for precision, to connote 
that actual competition is only one element of competition in the wider sense. 
41. E.g., Anthony Augliera, Inc. v. Loughlin, 149 Conn. 478, 485, 181 A.2d 596, 
600 (1962); Merchants' Nat'l Bank of Glendive v.Dawson County, 93 Mont. 310, 
321, 19 P.2d 892, 896 (1933). 
,42. FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 649 (1930); Allen B. Wrisley Co. v. 
FTC, 113 F.2d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1940). 
43. "It may be, as suggested ... that local monopolies cannot endure long, be­
cause their very existence tempts outside capital into competition; but the public 
policy embodied in the common law requires the discouragement of monopolies, 
however temporary their existence may be." Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United 
States, 85 F. 271, 284 (6th Cir. 1898), afI'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (citations omitted). 
By reasoning in this manner, Sixth Circuit Judge Taft permits or encourages the in­
ference that the public policy against local monopolies becomes stronger as the like­
lihood of their duration increases. That duration depends upon the various factors 
which bar outside capital from entering into the local market. 
This note's discussion of entry barriers is qualitative, rather than quantitative. 
The need for a long-run quantitative measure of the power to exclude is, however, 
addressed in Grossack, The Concept and Measurement of Permanent Industrial Con­
centration, 80 J. POL. ECON. 745 (1972). 
44. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. 
ECON. REV. 940, 941 (1963). 
Senator Edward M. Kennedy has asserted that market competition in the health 
care Held is both irrelevant and inappropriate. He describes the "economic injunc­
tion" of a free marketplace as "more is better." That injunction does not apply, he 
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quirements upon persons wishing to enter one of the health-related 
professions. The licensing te-sts generally require an extended pe­
riod of medical education, which requirement creates a delay be­
tween a change in market demand and the readjustment of the 
supply of healers. The threat of malpractice litigation and the high 
insurance premiums created by that threat may be deterring the 
expansion of existing health care facilities. Finally, the drug indus­
try has an interest in preserving these barriers to entry so that it 
can deal with a limited number of drug-dispensing middlemen. 
Some of these structural features of the health care market are 
justified in part by the public desire, arising out of the uncer­
tainties involved in the incidence and treatment of disease, to be 
assured of its healers' competence. 45 Unfortunately, they go further 
in their anticompetitive effect than is necessary for the public 
peace of mind. 46 A review of the nature and importance of the 
.chief barriers to new competitors will illustrate their effect. 
reasons, to health care. Too many surgeons in one area produce unnecessary surgery 
and unduly high fees. J. BRAVERMAN, supra note 3, at 28 . 
. The logic of this viewpoint is less than compelling. It is tautologically trUe that 
too many doctors are too many, and therefore more than enough. But in the absence 
of a competitive market system, there is no nonarbitrary standard to determine how 
many are enough. A market system does not imply that more is better. It only 
implies that what the consumer wants is better than what the consumer does not 
want. There is no reason why the wants of the consumer are less normative in health 
care than elsewhere. 
45. Arrow, supra note 44, at 966. 
46. For example, after the reform of such laws one might see immunization 

centers staffed entirely by registered nurses or other nonphysican health profession­

als. Id. at 956. 

More generally, a periodic recertification system has been proposed. Several 

grades of skill could be established. A person wishing to obtain a certificate to prac­

tice medicine would submit to examination every five years, or at some other agreed­

upon interval. The certificant would be rated along a publicized set of grades of 

skill. The certificate, with the rating on it, would have to be shown to all prospective 

patients. Patients could choose to buy health care from a practitioner at any of the 

skill levels or even, if they wished, from a "doctor" whom they knew not to have any 

certificate at all. In this freed-up market, the lower-skilled levels of health care pro­

fessional would remain competitive by offering lower fees than the others. A con­

sumer would make an informed trade-off between cost and quality. The advocates 

claim that the effects of such wide-open competition would most probably be a low­

ering of the cost of even the highest-certified doctors below most doctors' fees today. 

Another plan, which some might consider less drastic, is called institutional li­
censure. Institutions, such as hospitals, health maintenance organizations, and pro­
fessional associations, would require a license in order to operate. But there would 
be no further restrictions on the personnel a certified institution could hire, or which 
functions it could assign to which employees. This increased flexibility might have 
the same economic effect as the periodic certification plan. V. FUCHS, supra note 36, ­
at 60-61. 
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A. Licenses and Education 
Some states license as many as two dozen separate health oc­
cupations. 47 The effectiveness of licensing as a form of quality con­
trol is highly questionable given the extreme rarity of revocation or 
suspension of a practitioner's license. 48 Less restrictive alternatives 
to the present licensing system have been proposed that would al­
low greater leeway to competitive forces while providing an assur­
ance of quality. 49 
A decade or more, depending on the degree of specialization, 
will elapse from the time of a student's decision to take a premedi­
cal curriculum to the time of emergence as a full practitioner. 50 
Only a student who has completed two years at an American Med­
ical Association (AMA) approved school can take the first part of 
the licensing exam, which deals with basic science. 51 This require­
ment is an unnecessary restriction upon the supply of physicians. 52 
If one has acquired the knowledge to be able to pass such an exam­
ination at all, the source from which it has been acquired cannot 
reflect upon one's competence. 53 Therefore, the first half of the 
exam ought to be open to all who care to take it. Such an open ex­
amination system would not diminish the quality of the typical doc­
tor. It would have a positive effect upon quality since it would 
47. V. FUCHS supra note 36, at 76. 
48. Id. 
49. See note 46 supra and accompanying text. 
50. For a discussion of the economic effects of specialization, particularly of the 
postponement of earnings that prolonged training involves, see H. KLARMAN, supra 
note 37, at 82-83. It is also to be noted here that the term "health care supplier" is 
treated as synonymous with "physician." This usage is obViously a simplification, al­
though helpful for our purposes. In 1901, two out of every three persons in the 
health care field were physicians. By 1975 the rati~ was one out of twelve. V. 
FUCHS, supra note 36, at 56. But the physician clearly remains the central figure in 
the production of medical care. Id. at 56-57. 
51. Kessel, Higher Education and the Nation's Health: A Review of the 
Carnegie Commission Report on Medical Education, 15 J. LAW & ECON. 115, 121 
(1972). 
52. Another factor distorting the operation of market forces in medical educa­
tion is public subsidization. The high subsidies encourage entry by allowing for arti­
ficially low tuitions. Any positive effect upon competition this might have is, how­
ever, more than eliminated by the highly selective admissions process and the 
elimination of students during the course of studies. Arrow, supra note 44, at 952. 
It has also been suggested that there are equitable reasons to be concerned 
about this public subsidization. Admission to medical school is generally a ticket to 
the upper 10% in the income distriblltion of the United States. If this ticket is being 
bought out of general tax-obtained revenues, it has some of the features of a regres­
sive tax. Kessel, supra note 51, at 118-19. 
53. Id. at 122. 
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force medical schools to compete with liberal arts colleges, univer­
sity science departments, and scientific institutes in developing 
curriculum to provide the biological knowledge for which one will 
be tested. 54 Passing this exam, under an open system, would be an 
admission to the second two years, the more clinically oriented 
half, of medical school. 55 
These interlocking restrictions on licensing and education date 
from the 1910 publication of the Flexner report. 56 That report cri­
tiqued medical education and advised that medical schools be certi­
fied by the AMA in order to assure their quality.57 This quality as­
surance, naturally, has amounted to a control over quantity as well 
and thus indirectly to a control over the annual number of gradu­
ates from medical school. 58 Medical science since 1910 has 
undergone a series of triumphs; but medical economics since that 
year, when educational barriers to entry into the health care field 
were Significantly raised, has been a disaster. 59 
B. Relationship Between Medical Profession and Drug Industry 
Other than education, the major supply market for the med­
ical field is the drug industry. There are close ties between the 
drug industry and the medical profession. 6o These ties may 
strengthen the incentives of the medical profession to limit new 
entrants. 61 The AMA owns $28 million in drug company stock, and 
more than a quarter of the AMA's income comes from drug com­
pany advertisements placed in AMA publications.62 This financial 
54. Id. at 121, 126. 
55. Id. at 122. 
56. A. FLEXNER, MEDICAL EDUC. IN THE U.S. & CANADA, A REPORT TO THE 
CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING (4 Carnegie Founda­
tion Bulletin 1910). 
57. Kessel, supra note 51, at 121. 
58. S. KLAW, supra note 2, at 20. 
59. Id. at 21. In 1937 an alumnus of Harvard Medical School warned students 
at that institution that "I should recommend [medicine] only for the man who has 
plenty of money back of him. Many men never make much in medicine." L. 
THOMAS, THE MEDUSA AND THE SNAIL: MORE NOTES OF A BIOLOGY WATCHER 144 
(1979). 
60. These ties between the dominant firms in a supplier ind~stry and those 
they supply are manifestations of "imperfections in supply markets" as discussed in 
J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 15-20 (1956). 
61. The Supreme Court took account of the possibility of anticompetitive ef­
fects arising out of ties between supplier firms and their supplied industries in 
United States v. duPont & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1956). 
62. S. KLAW, supra note 2, at 124. Some of these drug advertisements raise se­
rious issues in themselves. For example, medical journals have run ads which ad­
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interface perhaps helps to explain why the AMA Journal continued 
carrying advertisements for certain drugs long after- the clear con­
sensus of scientific authority was that these drugs were ineffective 
and unsafe. 63 Likewise, if an increase in the number of practicing 
physicians is not in the interest of the drug companies, the in­
crease will be looked upon with some heightened degree of suspi­
cion by the AMA. For reasons which shortly will become clear, the 
established firms in the drug industry would not look kindly upon a 
large increase in the number of practicing physicians. 
The advertising tactics of the drug companies are geared to ap­
peal to a limited number of doctors and are conducted in intensive 
campaigns. The salespersons, known as detail men, discuss the ad­
vantages of one firm's products face-to-face with as many doctors as 
they can meet. 64 What is not done in person is done through large, 
direct mailing campaigns. 65 Large advertising costs are a recog­
nized part of product differentiation strategies: the seller in such a 
campaign incurs large costs in order to create significant buyer 
preferences for the established products. These preferences help 
• the established firms to set prices above their marginal costs with­
out attracting entry.66 Buyer preferences created by the large ad­
vertising expenses of the established firms are a barrier to the en­
try of new firms.67 The drug companies are acting rationally in 
courting the loyalty of the doctors because if those doctors, the es­
sential retailers of pharmaceuticals, are loyal to name brands, they 
will not provide a toehold for the entry of new competitors. 
Clearly, any enlargement in the set of medical doctors will 
make such tactics correspondingly less feasible. It intuitively might 
seem irrational for drug companies to want to limit the number of 
doctors for it would seem that more doctors would lead to the sale 
vised doctors to prescribe tranquilizers and antidepressants for patients, who are suf­
fering from nothing more than the normal strains of a full life: For a woman 
"depressed" over the marriage of her youngest child; for the loneliness of a new­
comer in town; or for the excessive use of the telephone. [d. at 120-21. 
63. V. FUCHS supra note 36, at 111-12. 
64. S. KLAW, supra note 2, at 122-25. 
65. For example, a Tennessee physician, who kept records of his mail, received 
44 drug samples, 125 direct mail advertisements, and 41 drug company published 
periodicals in one month. [d. at 117. 
66. In the absence of product differentiation or other entry barriers, an increase 
in price above the competitive level will improve the profit expectations of a poten­
tial entrant. Resources will be moved into this profitable field from elsewhere. See 
notes 30-34 supra and accompanying text. 
67. J. BAIN, supra note 60, at 115-17. 
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of more drugs. But there is no reason to expect that the presently 
established firms would make the extra sales. In understanding the 
barriers to entry to the medical profession, particularly the support 
of licensing and educational requirements by the AMA, it is impor­
tant to remember that the AMA has a financial interest in the suc­
cess of drug companies and that those companies conduct business 
in ways that rely upon a continuing limit upon the supply of physi­
cians. 6s 
C. Malpractice Litigation and Premiums 
The threat of malpractice litigation and the high insurance pre­
miums created by that threat may serve as another barrier to entry 
into health care. In the middle of the 1970's, malpractice claims 
were being filed at a rate of over 18,000 per year. 69 The frequency 
of malpractice claims made against those physicians insured by one 
major midwestern underwriter increased by 139% between 1969 
and 1974. 70 The increase in claims, combined with the great 
unpredictability in this area of the law, led to a dramatic increase 
in the size of the premiums required by some insurers and to the 
abandonment of the field by others. 71 
The entry barrier effect of malpractice insurance perhaps oper­
ates more noticeably upon institutions than upon individuals. It 
would be difficult to tell how many persons, if any, have aban­
doned or decided against a medical career because of the malprac­
tice problem: but a Cornwall, New York, hospital paid ten percent 
of its operations budget for insurance coverage in 1975. 72 The like­
68. In 1973, there were 15 drug companies in the FORTUNE 500. These 15 
companies earned, after taxes, more profit as a percentage of stockholder equity than 
any other industry group on that select list. This was one-half higher than the aver­
age rate of return for the FORTUNE firms listed that year. This would seem on its 
face to be evidence that the drug industry is itself less than perfectly competitive. S. 
KLAW, supra note 2, at 29. 
69. Id. at 95. 
70. Abraham, Medical Malpractice Reform: A 'Preliminary Analysis, 36 MD. L. 
REV. 489,490 n.3 (1977). The problem of malpractice insurance premiums became so 
severe that between 1975 and 1977 almost every state legislature enacted one or 
more measures intended to ease those costs. Id. at 489. The Abraham article was an 
attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of those measures. 
71. In 1975, the principal malpractice insurer in Ohio asked the state insurance 
board for permission to raise its rates by 747%. S. KLAW, supra note 2, at 106. 
72. J. BRAVERMAN, supra note 3, at 156. It seems logical to infer that the effect 
of malpractice insurarice rates upon the expansion of institutions also slows the entry 
of individuals into a geographic market. If high premiums prevent a hospital from ex­
panding to meet public demand, that hospital will not hire the extra personnel who 
otherwise would have been essential to that expansion. 
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lihood is that a hospital with such insurance costs will be deterred 
from expanding its' facilities even when local health needs other­
wise would call for such an expansion. Aside from this effect, the 
malpractice problem has inspired what has come to be called "de­
fensive medicine." This involves the use of unduly expensive and 
unnecessary procedures with an eye to impressing a possible future 
jury. 73 
This background material has identified the factors that are 
likely to raise health care prices, separately or in combination, by 
lowering competitive pressures. 74 The possible entry of new health 
care providers is not operating as ,a realistic threat to pricing at 
higher than the competitive level. 75 Competition between the ac­
tual providers of care in a given geographic market must conse­
quently be policed scrupulously to guard against inflated prices. 
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
The Sherman Act prohibits contracts or combinations "in re­
straint of trade. "76 A restraint of trade is any form of resource allo­
cation intended to supersede free, competitive forces. 77 Since 1910 
the United States Supreme Court has defined "restraint of trade" 
by applying what has come to be called the rule of reason. 78 Under 
this approach the effects of an arrangement are judged within a 
particular factual context; the arrangement is prohibited if those ef­
73. Id. at 149. 
74. One barrier not discussed in the text is the national requirement of a state­
issued certificate of need prior to the creation or expansion of a medical facility. Na­
tional Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974,' 42 U.S.C. §§ 
300k-300t (1976), as amended by Health Planning and Development Amendments of 
1979, Pub. L. No. 96-79, 93 Stat. 592 (1979). 
For a discussion of the anticompetitive effect of the certificates of need, see 
Comment, Certificate of Need and the Antitrust Laws: Can They Co-Exist?, 1980 
DET. C. OF L. REV. 599. 
75. This statement is not meant to imply that there is a national shortage of 
doctors. Since the markets for care are local, the notion of a shortage or surplus on a 
national level makes little sense. Until the supply of physicians begins adjusting it­
self to the demand through the discipline of a price system, there will be localized 
shortages. There is a concentration of physicians in the northeast and in the urban­
ized west. The rural west and south have difficulty attracting physicians. J. 
BRAVERMAN, supra note 3, at 35. Since the principal case with which this note is 
concerned arose in Arizona, there is most likely an undersupply of physicians rela­
tive to demand in that state. 
76. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). 
77. Forward: Antitrust and the Judiciary, 12:2 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 1, 
8-9 (1980). 
78. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1910). 
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fects are, on the whole, anticompetitive. 79 Some restraints of trade, 
though, are believed to have procompetitive effects and ought not 
be prohibited. 80 
A business relationship becomes categorized as per se illegal 
and thus no longer entitled to an ad hoc assessment of its reason­
ableness, however, if the probability of any particular instance of 
that activity being found to be procompetitive in effect is too small 
to justify the protractions and uncertainties of case-by-case adjudi­
cation. 81 Per se rules are attempts to save judicial resources by tak­
ing shortcuts to reasonable results. 82 
A. Price Fixing and Ancillary Restraints 
Price fixing has long been regarded as per se illegal. 83 Its ille­
gality does not depend upon whether the price level thus arrived 
at allows only a normal rate of profit for the participating firms be­
cause a price which is reasonable today may well be exorbitant to­
morrow. 84 Furthermore, price fixing is illegal even if it results in 
lower prices than some of the participants otherwise would have 
charged. 85 
The illegality of price lowering arrangements is important to 
an analysis of the instant case. Three major considerations support 
holding price lowering schemes illegal. First, contracts to lower 
prices, as well as those to raise prices, limit the ability of traders to 
sell in accordance with their own best judgment. Second, an artifi­
cial lowering of prices will deprive consumers of services and con­
veniences for which they otherwise would be willing to pay. 86 
79. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); 
American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921); Standard Oil 
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1910). 
80. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,218-21 (1940). 
81. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). "The fact is 
that courts are of limited utility in examining difficult economic problems. Our in­
ability to weigh, in any meaningful sense, destruction of competition in one sector of 
the economy against promotion of competition in another sector is one important rea­
son we have formulated per se rules." Id. at 609-10 (emphasis in original) (footnotes 
omitted). 
82. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,221 (1940). 
83. Id. 
84. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram 
& Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 541 
F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1976). See generally Brace & Nissen, Antitrust: Recent Develop­
ments in the Per Se Doctrine, 61 CHI. B. REC. 49 (1979). 
85. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951). 
86. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-54 (1968). See also National Soc'y 
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Third, courts will not always be able to distinguish a maximum 
price from a minimum price. 87 Maricopa County itself helps dem­
onstrate the difficulty of making that distinction: although the chal­
lenged arrangement was referred to by the participants, and by the 
court, as a maximum price, the state produced evidence tending to 
show that it had operated in fact as a minimum price. 88 The co­
gency of the state's evidence on that point was not determined but 
was left to be determined by the district court upon remand. 89 
Per se prohibitions are applied to disfavored business prac­
tices, generally without regard to the specific industry following 
the practice.9o An industry-by-industry analysis of the impact of 
per se rules would demonstrate that such rules are most useful 
where limit pricing is the greatest threat to consumer welfare, for 
example, where entry barriers are highest. In one area of antitrust 
decisionmaking the existence of entry barriers has long played an 
important role. Courts frequently base decisions as to whether to 
allow a merger under section 7 of the Clayton Act91 upon a deter­
mination of whether the acquiring firm reasonably might have been 
expected to enter the same market as the acquired firm through in­
ternal expansion. The law favors internal expansion over merger. 92 
In banking cases especially, this approach has engendered a con­
cern for state-imposed barriers to the entry of banks into new geo­
of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). "The assumption that 
competition is the best method of allocating resources in a free market recognizes 
that all ~lements of a bargain-quality, service, safety, and durability-and not just 
the immediate cost, are favorably affected by the free opportunity .to select among 
alternative offers." [d. at 695. 
87. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 153 (1968), points out that if the ac­
tual price charged under a maximum price scheme is nearly always that maximum 
price, the scheme acquires all the attributes of a minimum fixed price. The distinc­
tion ceases to correspond to a difference. 
88. [1980-1] TRADE CASES (CCH) at 78,153. 
89. "Nor are we prepared to reject out of hand the claim that a ceiling on fees 
does in fact reduce them." [d. at 78,155. 
90. See generally Note, Price Fixing and the Per Se Rule: A Redefinition, 
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 5 DEL. J. CORP. L. 73 
(1979). 
91. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976). 
92. See, e.g., United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973); 
United States v. EI Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964). EI Paso was the only 
supplier of natural gas in California. Pacific Northwest was the only other important 
interstate pipeline network west of the Rocky Mountains. The proposed merger was 
disallowed because the Court found that Pacific Northwest was a potential competi­
tor of EI Paso. This potential competition was a check upon EI Paso's monopoly 
power, and that check would be removed by a merger. [d. at 658-59. 
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graphic markets. The presence of such barriers makes the courts 
more hospitable to merger as internal expansion has been made 
more difficult. 93 That concern is analogous to this note's approach 
to Maricopa County. 
The Maricopa County decision relies heavily upon Broadcast 
Music94 for the proposition that certain horizontal arrangements 
which affect prices are not per se illegal. Dicta in the court's opin­
ion implies that Maricopa County would have been decided the 
other way had the Supreme Court never issued its Broadcast Mu­
sic opinion. 95 Yet the Maricopa County court seems confused as to 
what Broadcast Music means. In one sentence it says that Broad­
cast Music mandated a rule of reason analysis of "a traditional form 
of minimum price fixing. "96 In the very next sentence the court 
says that Broadcast Music denied that the facts with which it was 
dealing warranted the label "price fixing" at all. 97 In addition to 
these mutually contradictory sentences there is no analysis of why 
the Broadcast Music court reached its holding. 98 
93. United States v. Citizens & Southern Nat'! Bank, 422 U.S. 86 (1975); United 
States v. Marine Bancorp., Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974). In Citizens & Southern, the 
State of Georgia had long prohibited Atlanta banks from operating suburban offices. 
The Citizens and Southern National Bank [hereinafter referred to as C&S] bought 
5% of the stock of several suburban banks, and much of the remainder of the stock of 
those banks was purchased by parties friendly to C&S. These suburban banks there­
after functioned as de facto branch offices, using the C&S logo and receiving advice 
from C&S officers. [d. at 89. 
In 1970, Georgia changed its banking laws. C&S applied to the Federal Deposit 
Ins. Corp. [hereinafter referred to as FDIC] for permission to acquire the de facto 
branch offices outright. The FDIC authorized the acquisitions. The Jus­
tice Department, however, brought suit, alleging both the threat of a reduction in 
competition in relevant markets and the Sherman Act illegality of the earlier de facto 
arrangements themselves. [d. at 90. 
The Supreme Court decided that the de facto arrangements had been a reasona­
ble and procompetitive response to the anticompetitive state-imposed restraints. 
Those restraints were anticompetitive precisely in that they removed the threat of 
the entry of banks like C&S into the suburban markets. [d. at 91. 
Furthermore, the Justice Department's concern that the merger would diminish 
competition depended upon the Sherman Act argument against the de facto arrang­
ements, and they fell together. If the association with suburban banks prior to mer­
ger was a reasonable, competitive response to an anticompetitive law, formalizing 
those associations through a merger also was not anticompetitive. [d. at 121. 
94. See notes 17-18 supra and accompanying text. 
95. [1980-1] TRADE CASES (CCH) at 78,156. 
96. [d. 
97. [d.· 
98. In Broadcast Music, the majority pointed out that in the absence of an 
aggregating of licenses thousands of individual negotiations would have to be con­
ducted separately. This, the majority believed, would be a virtual impossibility. 
Were it possible to conduct individual negotiations, the prohibitive costs would have 
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Maricopa County and Broadcast Music are distinguishable on 
their facts. The latter case involved an association of composers 
who sold their copyrighted works to television networks for a flat 
fee. 99 One effect of this procedure was to reduce the opportunity 
for the competitive pricing of such works. But the court thought 
that this anticompetitive effect was incidental to the main lawful 
purpose, the creation of a mechanism by which the unauthorized 
use of these materials could be policed. loo Broadcast Music was 
the most recent in a line of cases that distinguishes agreements 
having the central purpose and effect of tampering with competi­
tive price from those agreements that have only an incidental or 
ancillary effect upon prices. 10l This distinction has very little rela­
tion to the facts of Maricopa County. 
Maricopa County presented a direct restraint upon price com­
petition, not an ancillary restraint with some other, lawful, chief 
purpose and effect. The FMC's arguments justifying the plan ef­
fectively concede this point. 102 Furthermore, the legal distinction 
between the facts of Maricopa County and Broadcast Music is sup­
ported by a genuine economic difference. Ancillary restraints upon 
competition sometimes can be justified by their economic effect, 
the reduction of transaction costs. Courts use a rule of reason anal-
anticonsumer effects which the law should seek to avoid. 441 U.S. at 20. 
Justice Stevens, in a separate opinion, concurred with the holding that the blan­
ket license was not price fixing, but dissented from the decision to remand. He 
would have affirmed the lower court's decision that blanket licensing was an illegal 
practice on the ground that there was a sufficient record for the Supreme Court to do 
its own rule of reason analysis and to conclude from that analysis that the 
anticonsumer effects of the blanket license scheme were greater than whatever the 
benefits may have warranted. Id. at 25 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
99. See note 17 supra for the facts of Broadcast Music. 
100. Although the copyright laws confer no right on copyright owners to fix 
prices among themselves or otherwise to violate the antitrust laws, we 
would not expect that any market arrangements reasonably necessary to ef­
fectuate the rights that are granted would be deemed a per se violation of 
the Sherman Act. 
441 U.S. at 19. 
101. E.g., Virginia Excelsior Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 256 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1958); 
Leader v. Apex Hosiery Co., 108 F.2d 71, aiI'd, 310 U.S. 469 (1940); Konecky v. 
Jewish Press, 288 F. 179 (8th Cir. 1923). 
102. The defendants claimed, for example, that setting the level of fees was 
necessary to preserve minimum standards of quality. [1980-1] TRADE CASES (CCH) 
at 78,153. There would have been no price fixing, according to the ancillary re­
straints theory, if FMC simply had set such minimum standards of quality which in 
turn had an unavoidable effect upon prices as an accidental byproduct. To set a price 
level on the theory that it will help preserve quality is to enact a direct restraint, 
however, not an ancillary one. 
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ysis to preserve agreements that reduce the costs of transacting 
when such transaction costs otheIWise would create a threat to the 
efficient allocation of resources. For example, a pooling of copy­
rights can achieve what otheIWise would require thousands of indi­
vidual negotiations and an intricate schedule of fees and uses nego­
tiated between individual composers and users. loa 
The economic benefits of reducing transaction costs may ex­
ceed the consumer loss attending an unavoidable and unplanned 
reduction in price competition with which it is accompanied. 104 
But the ancillary restraints exception to the per se rule against 
price fixing, employed in Broadcast Music, was erroneously relied 
upon in Maricopa County in a way that threatens to destroy the 
rule. The restrictions agreed upon by defendant doctors were initi­
ated explicitly to stabilize prices. There is no reason to believe that 
the restrictions had any effect upon transaction costs. 
The per se rules were described earlier as an aid in the 
policing of actual competition. The State of Arizona, however, also 
argued that such rules help maintain potential competition. That is 
the import of its contention that the FMC's might be pricing so 
low as to limit the threat of new entry. The court rejected this ar­
gument, in part on the authority of Richard Markovits, a scholarly 
critic of limit price theory who has argued that there can be no sat­
isfactory limit price theory without an account of the mechanism by 
which low prices will discourage, or high prices encourage, new 
entrants. There are two likely mechanisms: either the lower prices 
cause possible entrants to underestimate the available rate of re­
turn in that industry or the lowering of prices carries an implicit 
threat of power to retaliate in a price war against the entrants. lOS 
Markovits then suggests that most well-placed entrants, in most in­
dustries, are conglomerates looking for new areas of expansion. 
They are unlikely to be intimidated by an implicit threat of expan­
sion. 106 They also are unlikely to be kept in ignorance of the avail­
able rate of return in the target market by an artificial lowering of 
103. The problem of transactions costs and their tendency to produce ineffi­
cient results, that is, to prevent economic actors from bargaining toward their highest 
joint profits position was first clearly stated in Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 
J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960). Coase's analysis was applied to the problem of the optimal 
use of copyrights in Besen, Manning & Mitchell, Copyright Liability for Cable Tele­
vision: Compulsory Licensing and the Coase Theorem; 21 J. L. & ECON. 67 (1978). 
104. Oliver Williamson reviewed the whole field of antitrust from a transac­
tions cost standpoint in O. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES (1975). 
105. Markovits, supra note 22, at 668-69. 
106. Id. at 671. 
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prices. 107 Furthennore, limit pricing is not profit maximlZmg be­
cause an established finn can more cheaply preserve its market 
power by expanding to fill the market demand. Markovits de­
scribes this preferable course as "limit investment. "108 
These general objections to the validity of limit price theories 
have very little applicability to the facts of Maricopa County. Con­
glomerates are not the kind of potential entrant with which the 
State of Arizona was concerned. Furthennore, the chief expan­
sionary investment a physician can make is an increase in the num­
ber of hours per day he spends administering patients' needs. 109 
Yet that is not likely to limit entry significantly. A more general 
objection to the Markovits contention that limit pricing occurs 
rarely if ever is simply the empirical fact that it does occur. That 
being the case, further dispute as to its possibility is moot. 110 
Richard Posner, another critic of limit price theory, also was 
cited by the court in its discussion of Arizona's limit pricing con­
tention. 111 Posner describes limit pricing as a "foolish policy" of 
"zero monopoly profits, "112 but he expressly bases that conclusion 
upon the assumption that the entrant will have the same costs as 
an established finn, meaning that entry barriers are insignifi­
cant. 113 Identical costs, though, are not likely to exist because in 
many situations the established finns will have developed idiosyn­
107. Id. at 670. 
108. Id. at 680-84. The main burden of the case that Markovits is attempting to 
make against limit price theory is the irrationality of that policy in comparison with 
the much more efficient limits to the entry of competitors that aggressive investment 
can create. Unfortunately for the Markovits thesis, there is no reason why a combina­
tion might not pursue both courses. See note 27 supra for facts which might indicate 
that the FMC's were pursuing a course compatible with the Markovits concept of 
limit investment. 
109. S. KLAW, supra note 2, at 19. 
1l0. For example, there is reason to believe that duPont has deliberately 
adopted a pricing strategy to increase its control over the market for a particular 
paint pigment. Evidence shows that duPont has used limit pricing to make perma­
nent an accidental temporary advantage in its ability to produce a particular paint 
pigment. duPont's temporary advantage arose when Congress revised particulate 
emission standards for manufacturers, and the changes affected the production meth­
ods of the competitors more severely than they affected those of duPont. A price 
strategy has enabled duPont to prevent its competitors from achieving the full scale 
changeover to the now more efficient production method, and to drastically increase 
its own market share. Shepard, Anatomy of a Monopoly (II): The Power to Control 
Prices, 12:1 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 73,88-90 (1980). 
111. R. POSNER, supra note 22, at US n.SO. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
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cratic skills or information which will give them a cost advantage 
over entrants. 11.4 
The state argued that FMC's are in a position to unfairly pre­
vent health maintenance organizations (HMO's) from recruiting 
subscribers.115 HMO's are widely believed to present several ad­
vantages as a form of health care to consumers and to society.11.S 
Those economists who have defended the theory of limit pricing 
believe that such a price strategy is probable only when the actual 
suppliers, here the established physicians, are able to act in con­
cert.117 Since the existence of an FMC creates exactly that sort of 
concerted action, the limit pricing argument has considerable merit 
in support of retaining the per se illegality rule for price fixing 
within the health care industry. 118 
The intention to limit entry through pricing may be illegal 
whatever the probability of success may have been. The dissent 
contends that "vigorous enforcement of the law could encourage 
new forms of health care delivery that would significantly benefit 
114. O. WILLIAMSON, supra note 104, at 31-33. 
115. [1980-1] TRADE CASES (CCH) at 78.156. 
116. Ten benefits have been attributed to HMO's as distinct from fee-for­
service medicine: The HMO's remove incentives which otherwise exist for the pro­
vision of unnecessary services; introduce incentives for cost-effectiveness in the pro­
vision of care; create a decisionmaking body with both the knowledge and the 
incentive to discriminate in the purchase of supply products; strengthen incentives 
for the efficient internal organization of the supplier operation; eliminate duplicative 
records; create an incentive for the practice of preventive medicine; encourage refer­
ral to specialists when necessary; eliminate duplicative effort on the part of the con­
sumer; provide a better vehicle for post-discharge care; and strengthen the atmos­
phere for effective peer review. Havighurst, supra note 21, at 720-22. All these 
benefits are gained by combining the provision of care with the function of insurer. 
The HMO receives a prepaid premium from client families. The premium is deter­
mined actuarially, like an insurance company premium, in return for a promise to 
provide care to the extent of the subscriber's needs over the course of the contracted­
for period. Id. at 718. 
117. Joseph Bain's original formulation of limit price theory rested upon four 
articulated assumptions: That there is a generally effective concurrence of market ac­
tion among established sellers; that differences of opinion between these sellers will 
be settled in favor of the larger firms in the industry; that those larger firms will 
have the most favorable cost positions; and that those leaders generally will be cor­
rect in their estimate of what will forestall entry. J. BAIN, supra note 60, at 33. 
118. Havighurst, supra note 21, at 769-72. In Maricopa County the dissent 
noted that ..defendants have quite openly stated that their purpose is to protect fee­
for-service medicine against competing forms of health care delivery. While the de­
fendants may take steps to preserve traditional forms of doing business, they may not 
use restraints of trade to do so." [1980-1] TRADE CASES (CCH) at 78,164 (Larson, J., 
dissenting). 
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the public. "119 It also contends that, whether new fonns of health 
care delivery are being barred from entry by limit pricing or not, 
"It may not be necessary to assess the actual competitive effects of 
the controverted behavior where the unlawful purpose is clear."12o 
Intention to reduce competition may be shown directly or by infer­
ence from the actions taken by the defendant. 121 
Maricopa County acknowledged the law's disapproval of pred­
atory pricing, the practice of deliberately sacrificing present reve­
nues for the purpose of drivi.ng out rivals and recouping the losses 
through higher prices to be charged in the absence of competi­
tion. 122 The court, however, distinguished predatory pricing from 
limit pricing. 123 Predatory pricing is a short-tenn sacrifice, whereas 
limit pricing would be, the court suggests, a long-tenn sacrifice 
analogous to suicide. 124 This is not a convincing distinction. A price 
designed to limit entry allows the established finns more than the 
competitive profits, although smaller profits than a short-tenn, 
entry-inviting, monopolistic price. This does not resemble suicide. 
B. Exemptions 
The Maricopa County court also asserts that the special char­
acteristics of the medical profession deserve unique antitrust treat­
ment. Proposals for professional immunity have received a poor re­
ception in recent Supreme Court decisions. 125 Some of those 
opinions, however, contain language that recognizes that profes­
sional organizations have noncommercial purposes, such as peer re­
view, which might warrant somewhat different treatment than 
would be appropriate had they come· into existence for purely com­
mercial purposes. 126 The dissent noted an important flaw in the 
use of this argument under the instant facts: price fixing is clearly a 
commercial activity whether engaged in by doctors or plumbers. 127 
119. [1980-1] TRADE CASES (CCH) at 78,163 (Larson, J., dissenting). 
120. ld. at n.12. 
121. McLain v. Real Estate Bd. Inc., 100 S. Ct. 502 (1980); United States v. 
United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 n.13 (1978); United States v. Alumi­
num Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
122. [1980-1] TRADE CASES (CCH) at 78,156. 
123. ld. at 78,157. 
124. ld. 
125. ld. at 78,154 (citing Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975)). 
126. ld. at 78,157 (citing National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 
435 U.S. 679, 696 n.22 (1978); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); 
Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1977)). 
127. [1980-1] TRADE CASES (CCH) at 78,161 (Larson, J., dissenting). 
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There is another flaw in the argument for special antitrust 
treatment of professional organizations. When Congress intends to 
carve out an exemption, it can, and does, do so explicitly.128 The 
trend at present is in favor of removing some of those exemp­
tions. 129 For example, two provisos in section 1 of the Sherman 
Act, permitting certain kinds of resale price maintenance, were re­
pealed in 1975. 130 Regardless of the duration of that trend, it is in­
appropriate for courts to create exemptions or more lenient rules 
for the professions when Congress, if only by negative implication, 
has made the professions subject to the same strictures as other oc­
cupations. 131 An argument based upon the special characteristics of 
a trade ought to succeed only if that trade can be brought within a 
specific statutory exemption. 132 
128. E.g., Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-292 (1976); McCarran-Ferguson 
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 1011-1015 (1976). 
129. ~kCormick, .Uodi/lcotiOI/ or thl! AgriclIltllral Coopl!rati~1! Exelllptiol/: 
Good or Rod.", .!K A"TlTRUST L.J..565, 565-66 (1980); Schmalz, The II/SlImllCe Ex­
('IIII'tioll: Call II Be .Uodijied SlIccess/it/lu.", 4H A"T1TRUST L.J. ,579, 581-H4 (1980). 
130. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or cons­
piracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with 
fi)reign nations, is declared to be illegal: PrOljided, That nothing contained 
in sections 1 to 7 of this title shall render illegal, contracts or agreements 
prescribing minimum prices for the resale of a commodity which bears, or 
the label or container of which bears, the trademark, brand, or name of the 
producer or distributor of such commodity and which is in free and open 
competition with commodities of the same general class ... Proljided fur­
ther, That the preceding proviso shall not make lawful any contract or agree­
ment, providing lilr the establishment or maintenance of minimum resale 
prices on any commodity herein involved.... 
15 U.s.C. § 1 (1970) (em\Jhasis in original) (Provisos repealed by Act of Dec. 12, 
1975, Puh. L. No. 94-145, H9 Stat. HOI (1975)). 
131. Silver v. New York Stock En·h., 373 U.S. 341, 355-60 (1963). 
132. The insurance exemption, however, at one time was nonstatutory. Insur­
ance was defined as a noncommercial acti\'ity in Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall) 
16H (IH69). Therefi)re, since the regulatory power of Congress on which the antitrust 
laws constitutionally depend is limited to commerce among the several states, lan­
guage echoed in the Sherman Act itself, an insurance exemption was widely as­
sumed. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), 
overJ'\lled Palli's noncommercial characterization and created the demand fiJI' passage 
of a statutory exemption. That demand was met in 1945. 15 U.S.c. §§ 1, 1011-1015 
(1976). 
The antitrust exemption fil)' actions pursuant to a state policy also Illay he non­
statutory. In a federal system, where states retain s()\'ereignty. attrihution to Congress 
of an intent to lessen a state's control over its officers will not he made without 
strong indication in the tcxt of the statute to that effect. Parker \', Brown, .317 U.S. 
:341, 350-51 (19.!3). Gent'rally, then, those exemptions which are not statutory arl' 
grounded in the Constitution. Maricopa CO/lilt!! may he seen as hinting at the possi­
hility of a ('onlmon-law exelllPtion frolll uOl'lnal antitrust rules in some fields. There 
is no preL'l·dent till' this, 
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At the district court level defendants argued that the activities 
of the FMC's were within the statutory exemption for the business 
of insurance. The district court stayed a decision on a motion to 
dismiss on this ground pending the decision of a case then before 
the Supreme Court. 133 In that case, Royal Drug Co. v. Group Life 
& Health Insurance Co., 134 Blue Shield of Texas was alleged to 
have entered into agreements fixing the retail prices of pharmaceu­
ticals. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendant on 
the ground that the McCarran-Ferguson Act135 exempted the busi­
ness of insurance from the federal antitrust laws to the extent it is 
regulated by state laws. The Supreme Court eventually found, 
while Maricopa County was still in litigation at the district court 
level, that the pharmacies had not acquired Blue Shield's insurance 
exemption by association and that, on the contrary, Blue Shield 
had lost the benefit of McCarran-Ferguson by acting in concert 
with the pharmacies. 13s . 
The holding of the court in Group Life & Health Insurance 
CO.137 is determinative of the insurance exemption issue on the 
Maricopa County facts. Insurance companies are involved in the 
operation of the FMC's, and the foundations themselves might be 
said to have been functioning as insurers. The exemption, though, 
is to be narrowly construed and will not cover such cases. 13S 
C. 	 Extent ofJudicial Experience 
Possibly the single most important factor in the Maricopa 
County reasoning was the unwillingness to impose a per se rule in 
the absense of greater judicial experience with the competitive 
conditions of the health care market. The court regretted that "we 
know very little about the impact of this and many other arrang­
ements within the health care industry. This alone should make us 
reluctant to impose a per se rule with respect to the challenged 
133. State of Arizona v. Maricopa County l\ledical Soc'y, [1979-1] TRADE CASES 
(CCH) ~ 6:2,415, at 76,490 (Hied December :27, 1978). 
134. 	 556 F.:2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1977), lIffd, 440 U.S. :205 (1979). 
135. 	 Id. at :205. 
136. 	 ld. at :231. 
137. 	 ld. at :23:2-33. 
138. Justice Brennan dissented, arguing that when an agreement with a pro­
\'ider of benefits promised in a policy constitutes a critical element of risk predietion 
and directly allects the cost of pro\'iding the desired protection, such an agreement is 
a pal1 of the husiness of insurance and is immune li'om the prohibitions of the 
Sherman Ad. ld. at :2.5:2-53 (Brennan, ./., dissenting). See gelleral/u Comment, Til" 
.\lcC/uTlIll-Fergllsoll Act: A Time .fill' P/'OcolII/letitit'e Rdimll, :29 \',-\:\1). L. RE\·. 1:271 
( lD7fil. 
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arrangement. "139 Yet the newness of judicial experience with an in­
dustry should not be the determinative factor in the choice be­
tween a per se rule and the rule of reason. 
In Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. 14o the Su­
preme Court reasoned that the extent of the per se rules ought to 
be determined entirely by their probable economic impact rather 
than by concerns for retailer autonomy or other social considera­
tions. 141 In order to make a determination on economic grounds, a 
court should take into account both the structural features of the 
industries to which the per se rules will be applied and the effects 
of the practices to be prohibited upon those structural features. 
Justice Brandeis remarked, in a frequently quoted passage, that the 
rule of reason must be applied with an eye upon "facts peculiar to 
the business to which the restraint is applied. "142 
Likewise, if courts are to judge the validity of per se rules in 
particular businesses, which is the Maricopa County approach, the 
Sylvania economic impact approach requires a review of facts pe­
culiar to the business with which one is concerned. Sylvania over­
turned a: per se rule prohibiting vertical consumer restraints, that 
is, restraints imposed by a manufacturer seeking to reduce compe­
tition among the various retail outlets for its brand of a product. A 
per se prohibition against this kind of restraint upon intrabrand 
competition143 had been announced in United States v. Arnold, 
Schwinn & Co.144 The Sylvania court, in overturning Schwinn, de­
cided that the decrease in intrabrand competition may well be 
compensated for by an increase in interbrand competition, that is, 
Sylvania's increased effectiveness as a rival of other television man­
ufacturers.145 A rule of reason seemed better adapted than a per se 
rule to deal with the inescapable trade-offs between intrabrand and 
interbrand competition. 146 Justice White, concurring in Sylvania, 
139. [1980-1J TRADE CASES (CCH) at 78,1.54 (emphasis added). 
140. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
141. ld. at 56. 
142. Chicago Bc\. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 2.38-39 (1911)). 
143. Intrabrand competition arises between franchisees selling the same brand 
of a product. 
144. 388 U.S. 365 (1967). 
145. 433 U.S. at .51-.52. 
146. ld. at 52 n.19. 
In the wake of.syl(;allia, a serious question has arisen as to whether the per se 
rule against horizontal market division may now be subjcct to erosion. See Calkins & 
Polden, Illtrabralld Territorial Allocatiolls lIml the Per Se Rille, .30 DRAKE L. RE'·. I 
(1980-81). 
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noted that the Schwinn and Sylvania holdings might have been 
reconciled had the majority concerned itself with the differences 
between Schwinn's position in the bicycle market and Sylvania's 
position in the television market. Dominant firms need not be 
treated according to the same rules as fringe firms, and "Unlike 
Schwinn, Sylvania clearly had no economic power in the generic 
product market. "147 
The specific facts discussed in this note with regard to the 
health care industry are very clear. The FMC's had economic 
power within their geographic markets. Restrictions on entry posed 
by state licensing systems and an AMA veto over new facilities for 
medical education limited potential competition. The interlocking 
of the AMA and the drug industry gave the fonner an extra incen­
tive to maintain that limit. Finally, the threat of malpractice litiga­
tion has further increased health care costs. A per se rule against 
price fixing, which would increase the efficiency of the policing of 
actual price competition,148 is especially important in contemporary 
health care. 149 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Price fixing has long been regarded as per se illegal. A series 
of cases provides authority for an exception to that rule when an 
agreement's effect upon prices is an accidental and necessary ancil­
lary restraint resulting from an agreement among competitors who 
have another, lawful, principal purpose and effect. Broadcast Mu­
sic was an ancillary restraint case which authorized the application 
of a rule of reason to an agreement among composers to pool their 
copyrights. The Maricopa County decision mistakenly cited Broad­
cast Music as authority for a softening of the traditional per se pro­
hibition of intended price fixing. 
The per se illegality of price-fixing arrangements does not de­
147. 433 U.S. at 6.3 (White, .I., concurring). 
14H. In Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Ullited States,:3.'56 U.S. 1 (19.5H), the Court 
reasoned that the per se rille is jllstilled h~' the Ileed to a,'oid "an incredibly compli­
cated alld prolonged eeoll(lInic illvestigation into the elltire history of the illdllstr~' in­
,'oh-ed, as well as relatl·dilldllstries, in an ell!)rt to determine at large whether a par­
tielilar restraillt has beell IIIHl'as(lIIable, ..." Ill. at .5. 
149. The Slipreme COllrt has at least hilll<'d that entr~' barrier problellls are a 
",dor ill ddenninillg whether alld ill what degree the alltitrllst rules apply ill the le­
gal profl.ssioll. althollgh ill th" caSt' in which it dmpped tllis llint, Hat('s ". Stall' Bar, 
-1.3:3 L'.S. 3.50, .37H (1977), the chall(,Il,g('" pradic(' was Il('ld to h(, prot('d"d h,' til<' 
sta«' adioll dodrill(' of Park"r ". BrO\\"I'. :317 L'.S. :341 (I~J4:31. 
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pend upon whether those arrangements result in an increase in 
prices. Price lowering arrangements are per se illegal as well be­
cause competition is believed to be the most efficient method of 
allocating resources in regard to all elements of a bargain: Limit 
price theory defends the economic rationality of this belief because 
it asserts that immediate price lowering arrangements may inhibit 
entry by competitors and thus in the long run may preserve a price 
above that which competition would permit. 
The FMC's involved as defendants in Maricopa County are in 
a position to unfairly prevent HMO's from recruiting subscribers. 
If the entry costs of an HMO are somewhat above the operating 
costs of an established physician, the established physicians, when 
acting in concert, are able to agree to a price above the competi­
tive level but low enough to discourage the development of the 
HMO as an alternative form of health care. The law ought to re­
gard this as an anticonsumer threat. 
Maricopa County asserts that the special characteristics of the 
medical profession deserve unique antitrust treatment. There is no 
precedent for such treatment of clearly commercial activities within 
a profession. Fudhermore, this claimed professional exemption 
cannot be brought within any of the statutory exemptions in­
cluding, on these facts, that for the business of insurance. 
The court was unwilling to impose a per se rule in the absence 
of greater judicial experience with the competitive conditions of 
the health care industry. This argument implies that the degree of 
judicial experience with a field ought to be the sole criterion gov­
erning the applicability of per se rules. Precedent and common 
sense, however, suggest that the presence of barriers to the entry 
of new competitors ought to be another factor in that determina­
tion of applicability. 
Christopher C. Faille 
